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NOTES 
Contribution and Antitrust Policy 
Contribution I has suddenly become one of the most hotly de-
bated issues in antitrust law.2 Until recently, courts did not compel 
antitrust violators3 to contribute to the satisfaction of a judgment4 
l. Contribution, according to the co=on law of torts, is defined as distribution of the 
amount of damages sustained by the victim among the joint tortfeasors by requiring each to 
"contribute" to the total damages assessed. Indemnification is a concept similar to, and often 
confused with, contribution. Indemnification shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor to an-
other who is deemed responsible for making the full payment. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 
F.2d 330,331 {7th Cir. 1979); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 50 (4th ed. 
1971). 
2. Prior to 1979, antitrust contribution was advocated only by an occasional law review 
co=entator. See Corbett, Apportionment of l)amages and Contribution Among Coconspirators 
in Antitrust Treble Pamage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1962); Paul, Contribution and 
Indemn!fication Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 67 (1972); 
Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682 (1978). There has been a 
flurry of recent co=entary on the issue. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in 
Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779 (1979); Sellers, Contribution 
in Antitrust l)amage Actions, 24 VILL. L. REV. 829 (1979); Note, Contribution in Private Anti-
trust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980); Recent Developments, Contribution Among Anti-
trust Pefendants, 33 V AND. L. REV. 979 (1980). 
The Supreme Court will soon decide this issue. The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed without 
published opinion a denial of contribution rights in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Liti-
gation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), qffg. 84 F.R.D. 40 {S.D. Tex. 1979). See 949 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Jan. 31, 1980) (stating that the unpublished Fifth Circuit per 
curiam opinion relied on Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 
(5th Cir. 1979)). A petition for certiorari has been granted Sllb nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams 
Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). 
3. Antitrust violations that injure private plaintiffs are torts, see Chattanooga Foundry & 
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Wainwright v. 
Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 
F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Wash. 1968), and defendants who combine or conspire in causing plain-
tiff's injury are joint tortfeasors. See Corbett, Sllpra note 2, at 11 l. Courts have therefore 
turned to the law of torts in analyzing the antitrust contribution issue. See, e.g., Sabre Ship-
ping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
English co=on law denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors under the doctrine of 
Merryweather v. Nixan, IOI Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). A mistaken interpretation of the 
Merryweather doctrine led most American jurisdictions to deny contribution to both negligent 
and intentional tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, S11pra note I, at § SO; Leflar, Contribution and 
Indemnity Between Torrfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Reath, Contribution Between 
Persons Jointly Charged far Negligence - Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 
(1898). The co=on-law rule barring contribution has been modified by statute in most 
states, see Note, Contribution Among Joint Tor(leasors, 12 GA. L. REV. 553 (1978), and several 
uniform acts allowing contribution have been drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, e.g., UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT 
(1939 & 1955 versions); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§§ 4-6. 
Prior to 1979 few courts deviated from the rule of federal co=on law denying contribu-
tion. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952) 
(contribution denied in maritime personal injury case); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 
(1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (denying contribution to an antitrust de-
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against a fellow joint5 violator.6 In February 1979, however, the 
Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty 
Supply, Inc. 7 broke ranks with other courts and ruled that under 
fendant); DiBenedetto v. United States, [1975-1] U.S. Tax Cas. 87,330, 87,331 (D.R.I. 1974) 
(denying tax fraud defendant contribution); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines 
Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (denying contribution to an antitrust defend-
ant). But see Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (narrowing 
Halcyon and expanding admiralty rule which equally divides damages between culpable par-
ties). A co=on-law right to contribution has been implied under the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk 
(1976), but only by referring to express provisions allowing contribution under certain other 
sections of those Acts. See generally Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 1256. There are no provisions in the Sherman or Clayton Acts giving 
antitrust defendants a right to contribution. 
One recent co=entator has advanced the novel idea that some antitrust violations more 
closely resemble breaches of quasi-contracts than torts, and that contract rather than tort con-
tribution rules should be applied in those cases. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust 
Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 695-96 (1978). This theory has been rejected by the only court 
that has considered it. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 
897, 900 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979). 
4. Antitrust contribution has been invariably sought in the context of a treble damages 
action by a private plaintiff under Clayton Act§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). This Note therefore 
focuses exclusively on contribution in private treble damages actions. 
5. Defendants who combine to violate the antitrust laws and thereby injure a private plain-
tiff are jointly and severally liable for all damages sustained. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., concurring); Wilson P. Abraham 
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979); Wainwright v. 
Kraflco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. 
Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (W.D. Wash. 1968). 
Because each violator is severally liable for all damages sustained by a private plaintiff, the 
plaintiff need not sue all violators but may choose which of the conspirators he will name as 
defendants. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d at 899 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 1979); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d I, 8 (9th Cir. 1963), qffd 
per curiam, 362 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966); Wainwright v. Kraflco 
Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. 
Supp. 802, 804 (W.D. Wasl_l. 1968). Similarly, the government need not sue all possible con-
spirators in a civil antitrust suit, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 129 
n.2 (1966), and need not name all conspirators in a criminal antitrust indictment, United States 
v. Gasoline Retailers Assn., Inc., 285 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the 
possible unfairness which may result from a plaintiffs power to choose which of several poten-
tial defendants he will sue, see text at notes 68-93 i'!fra. 
6. Before Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 
(8th Cir. 1979), six courts refused to grant contribution to antitrust defendants - two in dicta 
and four in the holding of the decision. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614,616 (3d 
Cir. 1960) (dictum denies right of contribution under federal co=on law); Hedges Enter-
prises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,993 (E.D. Pa), mod!fication denied, 84 
F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (contribution against settling defendants denied); Olson Farms, 
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. 72,860, 72,861 (D. Utah 1977) (federal anti-
trust laws held not to afford a contribution remedy), qffd, [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th 
Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); El Camino Glass 
v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (contribution denied 
to an unintentional antitrust violator); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671,678 
n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (dicta denies antitrust contribution to intentional tortfeasors), qffd in part, 
remanded in part, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson Freight Co. v. Baugh-
man, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. 
Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (contribution against settling defendants denied). 
7. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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some circumstances an antitrust defendant would be entitled to con-
tribution from joint violators. 8 The chorus of reaction to Professional 
Beauty has been loud and dissonant.9 Courts, Congress, and anti-
trust practitioners have proposed a wide range of alternative contri-
bution rules. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Wilson P. Abraham 
Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc. 10 denies contribution in 
all cases; the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc. 11 denies it to intentional violators. A bill proposed by 
Senator Bayh12 authorizes contribution only in price-fixing cases, 
wliile a statute pro{>osed by the Antitrust Section of the American 
8. The Eighth Circuit ruled that contribution should be allowed where, in the discretion of 
the district court after a consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, fairness 
between the parties requires it. 594 F.2d at 1185-86. The court did not rule that the defendant 
in .Professional Beauty was entitled to contribution. It ruled only that contribution might be 
appropriate, and remanded the case for a consideration of all the circumstances. 594 F.2d at 
1186. As of yet, no antitrust defendant has received contribution in a reported federal case. 
9 . .Professional Beauty has also provoked confusion and uncertainty in antitrust settlement 
negotiations. One district court in the Eighth Circuit has refused to approve an antitrust settle-
ment that failed to release non-settling defendants from liability for the settling defendant's 
actions. In Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., (1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,059 al 
77,251 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion), Chief District Judge Eisele refused to accept a pro-
posed settlement with two of the defendants in an antitrust suit. Eisele ruled that, in view of 
.Professional Beauty, an antitrust settlement must release non-settling defendants from liability 
for the settling defendants' actions before it can be approved. 
At least four settlements filed in the Ninth Circuit have attempted to protect settling de-
fendants from subsequent contribution claims. The settlements, all filed in In re Cement and 
Concrete Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. 296, No. Civ. 76-488A (D. Ariz. 1979), each include one 
of two methods of insulating settling defendants from contribution liability. Two of the agree-
ments provide that the plaintiff will satisfy any contribution judgments against settling defend-
ants. See Settlement Agreement with New Pueblo Materials, Inc. (lodged Oct. 3, 1979) (copy 
on file with the Michigan Law Review); Settlement Agreement with Phoenix Redi-Mix Co. 
(lodged Oct. 1, 1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). In the other two agree-
ments, the plaintiffs agreed to reduce their own judgment against the contribution claimants by 
the amount of any contribution judgments against settling defendants. See Settlement Agree-
ment with Columbia Building Materials, Inc. (lodged Sept. 19, 1979) (copy on file with the 
Michigan Law Review); Settlement Agreement with River Cement Co. (lodged July 31, 1979) 
(copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
10. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 608 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979). Two 
district courts have dismissed antitrust contribution claims since the .Professional Beauty deci-
sion. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), qffd 
without opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979) (see 949 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 
A-9 (Jan. 31, 1980) for a statement that the Fifth Circuit in affirming relied on Wilson P. 
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979)), cert. granted sub 
nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-
972); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979) (contribution claim 
against settling defendants denied when filed nearly nine years after original complaint filed). 
In the Ampicillin decision, the court indicated only that contribution would be inappropriate in 
the immediate case, not that contribution should be denied in all cases. 82 F.R.D. at 650 
(citing Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th 
Cir. 1979)). 
11. (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 
(10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979). 
12. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bayh Bill]. The full text of the 
Bayh Bill, entitled "Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979," can be found at note 52 i'!fra. 
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Bar Association would allow contribution in all private suits. 13 
This Note examines the contribution controversy from an anti-
trust policy perspective. Part I summarizes the Professional Beauty, 
Abraham Construction, and Olson Farms decisions and sketches the 
major provisions of the Bayh Bill and the ABA Statute. Part II dis-
cusses four antitrust policy goals that figure prominently in both Cir-
cuit Court decisions and Congressional debate: fairness, deterrence, 
promotion of settlement, and reduced complexity of litigation. Part 
III argues that none of the rigid contribution rules proposed since 
Professional Beauty achieves the optimal balance of these policy 
goals. The Note concludes that a flexible rule permitting courts to 
assess the propriety of contribution in each case would best resolve 
this complex antitrust dilemma. 
I. POSITIONS IN THE CONTRIBUTION DEBATE 
A. Professional Beauty 
The controversial Professional Beauty decision involved a dispute 
between the two Minnesota distributors of La Maur, Inc. Profes-
sional Beauty Supply alleged that National Beauty Supply had 
persuaded La Maur to terminate Professional's franchise. 14 Profes-
sional sued National for treble damages, claiming that National's de-
mand upon the manufacturer for an exclusive dealership was an 
attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 
National filed a third-party complaint16 seeking contribution from 
13. The Antitrust Section's proposed statute is contained in American Bar Association, 
Report of The Section of Antitrust Law with Legislative Recommendation (Sept. 6, 1979), re-
printed without Minority Report in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-2 to 
E-3 (Oct. 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]. The full text of the statute can be found 
at note 60 infra. 
14. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1181 
(8th Cir. 1979). Before the suit was brought, Professional's franchise was renewed by La 
Maur. 594 F.2d at 1185. The existence of a business relationship between La Maur and Pro-
fessional at the time of the suit may explain why La Maur was not named as a defendant in the 
original complaint. See text at notes 77-79 infra. 
15. 594 F.2d at 1181. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act enables a private 
plaintiff to bring a suit for treble damages if he is injured by a violation of the antitrust laws. 
15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
16. A third-party complaint is filed before judgment against a person not previously party 
to the action. It is the most common procedure for asserting rights to contribution when the 
plaintiff has failed to name one of the joint antitrust violators as a defendant. See, e.g., Sabre 
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); El 
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Con-
tribution has also been sought in antitrust suits by (I) separate suit after judgment against the 
violators not named in plaintiff's antitrust treble damages action, see Olson Farms, Inc. v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), and by (2) cross-claim against 
defendants who had previously settled with the plaintiff in the litigation, see Hedges Enter-
prises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. 77,993 (E.D. Pa.), mod!ftcation denied, 
84 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 
(S.D. Tex.), qffd without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. 
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La Maur for its part in the alleged wrongdoing. 17 The federal dis-
trict court dismissed the third-party complaint, though Professional 
had not objected to it, 18 and National appealed. 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's contribution rul-
ing.19 After deciding that federal law governed the antitrust contri-
bution issue,2° Circuit Judge Stephenson21 ruled that policies of 
fairness and deterrence required a right to contribution in some anti-
trust cases. 22 The court sanctioned contribution despite contrary dis-
trict court precedent23 and despite claims that such a rule would 
Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); In 
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979). Theorc:!tically, antitrust con-
tribution could also be sought by a motion immediately following entry of judgment in the 
plaintiffs suit or by way of counterclaim against a plaintiff who was also culpable for the 
violation. See generally Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, supra note 2, at 818-21; Note, Contribu-
tions Under ihe Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 1256, 1283-86. 
17. 594 F.2d at 1181. National sought contribution or indemnification under both federal 
and Minnesota law. 594 F.2d at 1181. La Maur argued that the complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted and moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). 594 F.2d at 1181. 
18. 594 F.2d at 1184. . 
19. 594 F.2d at 1186. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that no federal 
right of indemnification existed under the antitrust laws. Indemnification was denied because 
allowing an antitrust violator to shift the entire loss to another party would decrease antitrust 
deterrence. Consistent with its contribution holding, the Court sought to ensure that "the loss 
will be apportioned among the joint wrongdoers so that the deterrent effect of the judgment 
will be felt by all culpable parties." 594 F.2d at 1186. This reasoning has already been en-
dorsed by several courts. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330,334 (7th Cir. 1979) (no right 
to indemnification where defendant violated section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78G)(b) (1976)); Florida Power Corp. v. Granlund, (1979-2] Trade Cas. 
78,493 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting antitrust settlement which would effectively permit indemni-
fication). 
20. 594 F.2d at 1182. Despite initial uncertainty, see, e.g., Corbett, supra note 2, at 119-28, 
it is now universally agreed that federal rather than state law governs antitrust contribution 
rights. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,700 n.5 
(10th Cir. 1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 & 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,111 
n.l (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 
1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
21. Judge Stephenson wrote for himself and Circuit Judge Heany. District Judge Hanson, 
sitting by designation, vigorously dissented. 594 F.2d at 1188. 
22. The opinion is vague as to just what circumstances would warrant contribution in an 
antitrust case. The remand to the district court for a consideration of "all of the circum-
stances," 594 F.2d at 1186, suggests that the district judge should consider in the instant case 
the factors of fairness, deterrence, complexity, and encouragement of settlement, just as the 
circuit court considered them in the abstract. Judge Stephenson referred to Justice White's 
concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 
146-47 (1968), for specific factors a district court should consider: (I) "relative responsibility 
for originating, negotiating, and implementing the scheme"; (2) ''who might reasonably [be] 
expected to profit from • . . the conduct making the scheme illegal"; (3) "whether one party 
attempted to terminate the arrangement and encountered resistance or counter-measures from 
the other"; and (4) ''who ultimately profited or suffered from the arrangement." 
23. 594 F.2d at 1182-83. Judge Stephenson cited seven district court decisions, four ex-
pressly denying contribution, one denying it in dictum, and two denying it "arguably by impli• 
cation." He dismissed all but the El Camino Glass and Sabre Shipping decisions because they 
failed to give reasons for their contribution ruling. Sabre Shipping was questionable authority 
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violate congressional intent,24 deter settlement,25 and further compli-
cate litigation.26 The case was remanded for the district court to de-
termine whether, upon consideration of all the circumstances, 
National was entitled to pro rata27 contribution from La Maur.28 
"The deciding factor in our decision," wrote Judge Stephenson, 
"is fairness between the parties."29 The Eighth Circuit identified two 
elements of unfairness in the denial of contribution to National: the 
placing of the entire loss upon National even though La Maur might 
be equally responsible for plaintiff's damages, and the possibility 
that only undue influence by La Maur upon Professional had pre-
vented the manufacturer from being named as a defendant. 30 
The Eighth Circuit also argued that denying contribution dilutes 
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. Since the absence of contri-
bution allows many antitrust violators to go "scot-free" while one is 
held liable for all the damages, the court reasoned that "[t]his possi-
bility of escaping all liability might cause many to be more willing 
for denying contribution, claimed the Circuit Judge, because it relied heavily on a similar 
ruling in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), a case 
significantly narrowed by Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). 
See generally Note, Contribution in Private Antitmst Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 687-92 
(1978). The Eighth Circuit agreed with much of the reasoning of El Camino Glass-, it differed 
only on the relative weights to be assigned to arguments for and against antitrust contribution. 
594 F.2d at 1183. 
24. The Sabre Shipping and El Camino Glass decisions argued that Congress intended to 
deny contribution to antitrust violators. In part, they reasoned that the absence of express 
contribution provisions in the antitrust laws, coupled with the presence of express contribution 
provisions in certain sections of the securities laws, indicated congressional intent to prohibit 
contribution in the former class of cases. See El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] 
Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President 
Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Eighth 
Circuit's rejection of this "congressional intent" rationale for denying contribution, and most 
commentators would probably agree with its statement: "We do not ... interpret this omis-
sion [of statutory contribution rights from the Sherman and Clayton Acts] as evidence that 
Congress necessarily intended to deny contribution under the antitrust laws. . . . It is more 
likely that this narrow question . . . never occurred to the drafters of the legislation." Wilson 
P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979). See Note, 
supra note 23, at 699-700. Since both the Eighth and Fifth Circuits rejected congressional 
intent as a deciding factor in their contribution decisions, this Note will deal no further with 
that issue. 
25. 594 F.2d at 1184. See text at notes 117-33 i,!fra for a discussion of the settlement issue. 
26. 594 F.2d at 1184-85. See text at notes 134-49 i,!fra for a discussion of the increased 
complexity that allowing antitrust contribution might cause. 
27. Contribution could be measured in a number of ways. As pro rata contribution is 
usually defined, each violator contributes equally to any judgment returned against one, re-
gardless of the violator's relative fault. See W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 50, at 310. Antitrust 
contribution shares could also be measured according to comparative fault, percentage of 
sales, or percentage of profits. See notes 170-72 i,!fra and accompanying text. 
28. 594 F.2d at 1182. The circuit court also directed the district court to consider further 
the pendent Minnesota state law claims for contribution and indemnity. 594 F.2d at 1187-88. 
29. 594 F.2d at 1185. 
30. 594 F.2d at 1185. 
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... to engage in wrongful activity."31 Even intentional violators, 
who were routinely denied contribution at common law, were to be 
allowed contribution because of this deterrence argument.32 
Senior District Judge Hanson, sitting by designation, dissented 
from the majority's contribution ruling. He argued that the policy of 
deterrence did not support the majority's rule allowing contribution 
because it was unclear whether the rule would deter or encourage 
antitrust violations.33 Noting that Professional's suit could succeed 
only if National intentionally violated the law, Judge Hanson sug-
gested that contribution among intentional antitrust violators would 
be especially inappropriate.34 The dissent-also claimed that allowing 
contribution would intolerably increase confusion, delay, and com-
plexity in antitrust suits, and would thereby chill plaintiffs' incentive 
to bring private suits. 35 
B. Abraham Construction 
Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc. 36 
arose out of a conspiracy among New Orleans-area concrete manu-
facturers to raise and stabilize prices. In 1973 a grand jury indicted 
four manufacturers, including Texas Industries, for violating section 
I of the Sherman Act. Criminal prosecutions culminated in nolo 
contendere pleas. In 1975 Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corpo-
ration brought a treble damages action against Texas Industries 
alone, basing its claim on the same violation that was the subject of 
the prior criminal suit. Texas Industries thereupon filed a third-
party complaint against its three criminal codefendants, seeking con-
tribution from them should it be found liable to Abraham. Bowing 
to the weight of authority, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion by the third-party 
defendants to dismiss the contribution claim. Judge Thornberry of 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, ruling that under no circum-
31. 594 F.2d at 1185. This reasoning contrasts sharply with that in Wilson P. Abraham 
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979), as well as that in El 
Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 ("the court believes that 
the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be increased by not permitting defendants to 
redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation"). See text at notes 101-16 i'!fra for an analysis of 
the deterrence debate. 
32. 594 F.2d at 1186. 
33. 594 F.2d at 1189-90. 
34. 594 F.2d at 1188-89. But cf. Getter v. R. G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559 (S.D, 
Iowa 1973) (implying a right of contribution under certain sections of the securities laws in 
favor of an intentional violator). In Getter, Judge Hanson argued that an intentional tortfeasor 
"should not be allowed to escape liability under the Securities Act by the fortuitous circum-
stance that he was not sued in the main cause of action. Ifhe is a joint-tortfeasor, he should be 
held to contribution to facilitate enforcement of the obligations imposed by the Securities 
Act." 366 F. Supp. at 569. 
35. 594 F.2d at 1189-90. 
36. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), rehearing en bane denied, 608 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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stances would contribution be available to antitrust violators in the 
Fifth Circuit.37 
The Abraham Construction decision rejected the Eighth Circuit's 
conclusion that deterrence and fairness require contribution. The 
court observed that "prevailing economic theory" indicates that de-
nying contribution is more likely to deter anticompetitive conduct 
than allowing it.38 The Fifth Circuit minimized the unfairness of a 
no-contribution rule, concluding that the threat of collusion39 or co-
ercion40 posed by a no-contribution rule was insufficient to outbal-
ance the advantages of a no-contribution rule, and was mitigated by 
the possibility that a victim of collusion or coercion might have an 
independent cause of action for relief.41 
The Fifth Circuit made it clear that its ruling barred contribution 
even among unintentional violators. Judge Thornberry claimed that 
allowing contribution to unintentional violators would reduce deter-
rence. 42 He dismissed as "problematic" the harshness that might re-
sult should unintentional violators be barred from contribution. 
Circuit Judge Morgan dissented from the part of the Abraham Con-
struction decision that denied contribution to unintentional antitrust 
violators. He found it intolerable to force a defendant guilty of no 
conscious wrongdoing to "bear total responsibility for the sins of 
many."43 
C. Olson Farms 
In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the Tenth Circuit 
created a hybrid contribution rule from the Professional Beauty and 
Abraham Construction decisions. Five Utah egg distributors, includ-
ing Olson Farms, had fixed the prices at which eggs were purchased 
from producers. Fourteen producers singled out Olson Farms for an 
37. Those aggrieved by the decision were instructed to tum to Congress for a statutory 
remedy. 604 F.2d at 906. 
38. 604 F.2d at 901 & n.8 (citing Note, supra note 23, at 702). 
39. A rule barring contribution permits a plaintiff to "collude" with one of the potentially 
liable parties and then to bring a suit against a different defendant. "Collusion" is loosely used 
and rarely defined by the courts when contribution is at issue. See note 77 i,!fra and accompa-
nying text. 
40. Coercion is possible where contribution is barred because a plaintiff can threaten a 
defendant who refuses to settle with the possibility of bearing the entire liability for a conspir-
acy alone. See text at notes 84-95 i,!fra. 
41. 604 F.2d at 901-02. See text at note 83 i,!fra. The court also noted that Texas Indus-
tries did not allege any instance of coercion or collusion in the immediate litigation. 604 F.2d 
at 901-02. 
42. Judge Morgan took strong issue with this point. 604 F.2d at 907 (Morgan, J., dissent-
ing). He has the better of this argument. See text at notes 107-09 i,!fra. ' 
43. 604 F.2d at 908 (Morgan, J., dissenting). "I would, in the interest of fairness, award 
contribution to a defendant whose liability is based solely on an unintentional violation of the 
antitrust laws." 604 F.2d at 906-07 (Morgan, J., dissenting). 
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antitrust suit,44 even though it had purchased only eleven percent of 
the eggs involved.45 Olson Farms lost the suit and subsequently sat-
isfied a $2,400,000 judgment, more than twenty-four times the dam-
ages directly attributable to its purchases.46 The district court 
dismissed Olson Farms's separate suit seeking cont'ribution from its 
coconspirators.47 
Judge Miller, writing for the Tenth Circuit,48 affirmed the denial 
of contribution rights. After a review of the policy arguments made 
for and against contribution in the Professional Beauty majority and 
dissenting opinions, the Tenth Circuit decided to wait for a clear sig-
nal from Congress before entering "such a complex policy thicket."49 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth ruled that intentional antitrust vio-
lators such as Olson Farms were barred from asserting contribution 
rights. Circuit Judge Holloway dissented, pointing out that "[t]here 
are important reasons rooted in the antitrust laws for . . . allow[ing] 
recovery by intentional tortfeasors."50 
In dicta, the Tenth Circuit briefly mentioned that unintentional 
violators might be excepted from its decision barring contribution. 
With that single phrase and its accompanying footnote, the opinion 
at least partially endorses Professional Beauty.51 For the sake of un-
intentional violators the Tenth Circuit is apparently willing to 
plunge into the policy thicket it avoided in the Olson Farms case. 
44. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de11ied, 
429 U.S. 1122 (1977). 
45. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,700 (10th Cir. 
1979), reheari11g en ba11c gra111ed, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979). 
46. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,700 n.4. 
47. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., (1977-2] Trade Cas. 72,860, 72,861 (D. Utah 
1977). 
48. Judge Miller, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, was sitting by 
designation. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699, 79,699 
(10th Cir. 1979). 
49. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,704. The court specified four species of thorny issue within 
the contribution "policy thicket": (1) For what type of conduct will contribution be allowed? 
(2) How will contribution shares be calculated? (3) What effect will rights to contribution have 
on settlements? and (4) By what procedures will defendants be able to assert contribution 
claims? 
50. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,706 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Judge Holloway concurred in affirming the dismissal of the indemnity claim. (1979-2] Trade 
Cas. at 79,708 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
51. (1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,704 & n.15. Footnote 15 of the opinion outlines how trial 
judges are to exercise their discretionary power to grant contribution rights to unintentional 
violators. First, where contribution is sought in a separate suit after judgment, account should 
be taken of whether the party seeking contribution made a reasonable effort to bring joint 
violators into the original suit through rules 13 (cross-claim and counterclaim) and 14 (third-
party claim) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial judge may further examine the 
factors listed by Justice White in Perma Life and cited in Professio11al Beauty. See note 22 
supra. Finally, the court noted that exceptions for violators "may be squeezed out in the rare 
'ad absurdarn' or 'shock the conscience' type case, but not where contribution might predict-
ably tend to frustrate observance and enforcement of the antitrust laws." 
May 1980) Note - Antitrust Contribution 899 
D. The Bayh Bi!/52 
Senator Bayh's contribution bill, S. 1468, was Congress's first re-
action to the Professional Beauty decision.53 The bill would amend 
section 4 of the Clayton Act to grant contribution rights to all price-
:fixing54 antitrust defendants. According to the Judiciary Committee 
52. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12. The text of S. 1468 is as follows: 
A Bill To provide for contribution of damages attributable to an agreement by two or 
more persons to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton 
Act. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting after section 4H the following new section: 
"SEC. 41 (a) Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages attributable 
to an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act 
may claim contribution among them according to the damages attributable to each such 
person's sales or purchases of goods or services. A claim for contribution by such person 
or persons against whom an action has been co=enced may be asserted by cross-claim, 
counterclaim, third-party claim, or in a separate action, whether or not an action has been 
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the persons from whom contribution is 
sought. 
"(b) A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in 
settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this section shall 
not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms expressly so provide. The 
court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the release or covenant against other 
persons subject to liability by the greatest of: (1) any amount stipulated by the release or 
covenant, (2) the amount of consideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages 
attributable to the settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3) 
above, actual damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this Act. 
"(c) A release or covenant, or an agreement which provides for a release or covenant, 
entered into in good faith, relieves the recipient from liability to any other person for 
contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving the release or covenant, or 
agreement, unless the settlement provided for in any such release, covenant, or agreement 
is not consu=ated. 
"(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability of any person 
who enters into an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices. 
"(e) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act 
co=enced after the date of enactment of this section." 
53. The Bayh bill was first proposed as an amendment to S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979), in May 1979. Hearings on the amendment were held in June. See Antitrust Equal 
Eeforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and 
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Senate Hearings]. The amendment was subsequently withdrawn and reintroduced as 
a separate bill, which was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on July 31, 1979. See S. 
REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The Bill now 
awaits action on the Senate floor. 
54. The Bill and the Senate Report fail to define price-fixing. This could be the source of 
some confusion. The Supreme Court has recognized that price-fixing is essentially a term of 
art attached to any of the variety of practices which are found to be per se illegal. See Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979). It is therefore 
difficult to predict whether many practices, such as exchange of information among competi-
tors, will be defined as price-fixing by the courts. See Posner, Ieformation and Antitrust: Re-
flections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1197 (1979). And in the 
wake of the Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Catalano Inc. v. Target Sales Inc., 100 S. 
Ct. 1925 (1980), it seems likely that the Court will broadly define the term price-fixing in the 
future. See Nannes, A Price-Fixing Surprise, Per Se: Implications of the Catalano Case, NATL. 
LJ., July 7, 1980, at 23, col 1. 
It is also uncertain how the bill applies to vertical price-fixing. See 940 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Nov. 22, 1979) (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Shenefield). 
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report on the Bayh Bill, courts would remain free to grant or with-
hold contribution rights in non-price-fixing cases.55 
Senator Bayh and other supporters of S. 1468 claim that its pri-
' mary purpose is to prevent coercion of settlements from small and 
medium-sized corporate defendants.56 Novel provisions governing 
contribution-share measurement and claim reduction are designed to 
achieve this goal without deterring fair settlements. Each violator 
contributes to the plaintiff's recovery according to the damages di-
rectly attributable to that violator's sales.57 If the plaintiff settles 
with one defendant, the court will reduce his claim against the re-
maining violators by treble the damages attributable to the settling 
defendant's sales.58 To preserve the incentive to settle, the bill ex-
empts settling defendants from liability for contribution. 59 
E. The ABA Statute60 
In reaction to the rapid progress of the Bayh Bill in the Senate, 
the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association proposed its 
55. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 12, 21. Many types of agreements that are not 
price-fixing may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, including a wide variety of vertical 
restraints imposed upon distributors by manufacturers. Joint violations of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, such as that alleged in the Professional Beauty case, would also fall outside the 
scope of the Bayh Bill. Although critics of the Bayh Bill claim it is therefore underinclusive, 
see ABA Report, supra note 13, at 2, the Bill would probably cover the majority of cases in 
which contribution is sought. Six of the eight cases which have so far raised the contribution 
issue involved alleged price-fixing in violation of section 1, viz., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. 
Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores 
Inc., [1979-2) Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th 
Cir. Dec. 27, 1979); Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc. [1979-1) Trade Cas. 77,993 
(E.D. Pa.), modffecation denied, 84 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), qffd. without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th 
Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3821) 
(U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., (1977-1) Trade Cas. 
72,110 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 
1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
56. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at I; Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 3. Coer-
cion of settlements is discussed at text accompanying notes 84-95 infra. 
57. Where the conspiracy fixed prices at which goods or services were purchased, 
purchases rather than sales are the basis for measuring damages. 
58. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12, at 4I(b), reproduced al note 52 supra. The subsection 
duplicates New York's contribution statute, which provides that a plaintiJrs recovery against 
non-settling defendants shall be reduced by the greatest of (1) the consideration paid for the 
settlement release, (2) the amount stipulated in the settlement agreement, or (3) the amount of 
the released tortfeasors' equitable share of the damages. N.Y. GEN. Osuo. LAW§ 15-108(a) 
(McKinney 1978). 
59. See text accompanying notes 121-25 infra. 
60. "A Statutory Proposal for Contribution," ABA Report, supra note 13, at E-2, E-3 
[hereinafter cited as ABA STATUTE]. The full text of the proposed statute reads as follows: 
Contribution Rights of J)ej"endanls. 
"(a) In any action brought under section 4, 4A or 4C of the [Clayton] Act, if the 
damages recoverable from any defendant were, in whole or in part, caused by the 
wrongful acts or omissions of another, rights of contribution shall exist and be enforceable 
in accordance with this section, and not otherwise. 
"(b) Claims for contribution in antitrust actions may be asserted by the filing of a 
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own broader and more detailed contribution statute. The ABA Stat-
ute would grant contribution rights to all defendants in private anti-
trust suits. The Antitrust Section argues that the need to prevent 
unfairness by allowing contribution is just as great in non-price-
fixing cases as in price-fixing cases.61 
Other provisions of the ABA Statute resemble those of the Bayh 
Bill. The proposed statute would bar contribution claims against set-
tling defendants.62 It would require a court to reduce the plaintiffs 
claim against the remaining defendants by the amount of the contri-
bution share otherwise chargeable to the settling defendant.63 The 
ABA Statute, however, measures contribution shares according to 
the "relative responsibility" of each party,64 rather than according to 
counter-claim, cross-claim or third party claim in the same action as that in respect of 
which contribution rights are claimed, or in a separate action. 
"(c) Claims for contribution will be barred unless they are filed (i) within one year of 
the date of service of the original complaint giving rise to potential liability, or (ii) within 
sixty (60) days after the claimant for contribution receives reasonable notice of his liability 
or potential liability based in whole or in part upon damages caused by the wrongful acts 
or omissions of another, whichever date occurs later. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
claims for contribution shall be barred unless they are filed within sixty (60) days after the 
entry of final judgment by the district court awarding damages against a prospective 
claimant for contribution. 
"(d) Contribution rights may be claimed only against those persons for whose 
wrongful acts or omissions plaintiff seeks to recover damages from one or more 
defendants. 
"(e) Contribution may not be obtained in favor of or against a person who, pursuant 
to a settlement agreement with a plaintiff in the action in respect of which contribution 
rights are claimed, has been released from potential liability for the underlying claim. To 
avail itself of this paragraph, a settling defendant must advise the court and all other 
defendants, in writing, of the existence of the settlement agreement within sixty (60) days 
of its execution. 
"(f) Following a settlement in the action in respect of which contribution rights are 
claimed with less than all defendants, the plaintiff may, within sixty (60) days of the 
settlement, elect to withdraw from the damage action all claims based upon the acts or 
omissions of the settling person or persons. Failing such an election by plaintiff, the court 
shall reduce any judgment by the amount for which each settling defendant would have 
been liable for contribution had there been no settlement. 
"(g) Contribution claims shall be determined by the court following the trial of the 
action in respect of which contribution rights are claimed in accordance with the relative 
responsibility of each party for the damages awarded in the main action which are subject 
to contribution rights as provided herein. 
"(h) Nothing in this section shall preclude two or more persons from agreeing to (i) 
apportion their collective liability in some manner other than as specified in this section or 
(ii) toll the automatic barring effect of paragraph (c). 
"(i) This section shall apply only to actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act 
commenced after the date of enactment of this section." 
61. See ARA Report, supra note 13, at E-1. 
A Minority Report, attached as an appendix to the ABA Report (but not reprinted with it 
in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. {BNA) E-1) [cited hereinafter as Minority Report), 
claims that the proposed statute would frustrate settlements, lessen the deterrent effect of the 
Sherman Act, and substantially complicate antitrust litigation (a copy of the Minority Report 
is on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
62. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (e). The statute also provides a statute of limitations 
for contribution claims,§ (c), and by implication validates sharing agreements among defend-
ants,§ (h). 
63. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (f). 
64. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (e). 
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the "damages attributable to each . . . person's sales or purchases," 
as the Bayh Bill provides.65 
The circuit court opinions and statutes summarized above can be 
ordered according to their liberality in creating contribution rights: 
(1) Contribution rights mandated in all antitrust cases (ABA 
Statute). 
(2) Contribution rights mandated in price-fixing cases and 
available at the courts' discretion in other cases (Bayh Bill).66 
(3) Contribution allowed at the district court's discretion in all 
cases (Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty; Judge Holloway's dis-
sent in Olson Farms). 
(4) Contribution allowed at the district court's discretion for 
unintentional violators and barred in all other cases (Tenth Circuit 
in Olson Farms). 
(5) Contribution barred in all cases (Fifth Circuit in Abraham 
Construction; Judge Hanson's dissent in Professional Beauty). 
The rational means to choose among these rules is to determine 
which best promotes relevant antitrust policy goals. 
II. CONTRIBUTION AND THE CONFLICTING GOALS 
OF ANTITRUST POLICY 
The debate among courts and commentators over antitrust con-
tribution revolves around four goals of antitrust policy: fairness, de-
terrence, promotion of settlement, and reduction of complexity of 
litigation. Other antitrust reforms besides allowing contribution 
would promote some of these same policy goals. Unfairness might 
be reduced by holding a joint violator liable for only a portion of the 
plaintiffs total damages. Exacting more severe penalties, such as 
quadruple or quintuple damages, might better deter antitrust viola-
tors. Settlements could be encouraged by exacting substantial fees 
for the use of the courts. Yet Congress has been reluctant to use such 
direct means to achieve antitrust policy goals, preferring instead to 
tinker with procedural devices such as contribution.67 
This Part of the Note discusses the relation between the various 
policy goals and a defendant's right to contribution. Although the 
goals are considered separately, they are neither independent nor ab-
solute. A contribution rule that achieves perfect fairness may entail 
65. Bayh Bill, supra note 52, at § 41(a). 
66. The Bayh Bill leaves contribution rules in non-price-fixing cases to judicial develop-
ment See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
67. Although courts continue to wrestle with central principles of antitrust doctrine, see 
Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developme_nts- 1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. I, I (1980), most recent 
Congressional reform proposals involve procedural changes. See 950 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP. (BNA) E-13 (Feb. 7, 1980) (describing five antitrust procedural reform bills under 
consideration in the House of Representatives). 
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intolerable complexity; a rule that deters all violations may be intol-
erably unfair. 
A. Fairness 
Because joint antitrust violators are jointly and severally liable 
for all damages caused by their common activity, a private plaintiff 
may sue one violator for all damages incurred. When a defendant 
singled out for such a suit is denied contribution, he alone must pay 
treble the damages caused by all the joint violators.68 Courts and 
commentators often refer to the unfairness of this result. 69 Three 
types of inequity fall under the fairness rubric in the antitrust contri-
bution debate. Denying contribution may cause unfairness (1) by 
inequitably allocating loss among joint violators, (2) by making pos-
sible collusion against one of the violators by the plaintiff and an-
other violator, and (3) by enabling plaintiffs to coerce defendants 
into settlement. 
1. Unfairness in the Allocation of Loss 
Regardless of the plaintiff's motive for targeting one antitrust vi-
olator for suit,70 the denial of contribution in such a case seems un-
fair because it "places the full burden of restitution upon one who is 
only in part responsible for a plaintiff's loss."71 This result seems 
especially unfair if the violators that escape liability are more culpa-
ble than the defendant,72 or if the defendant unintentionally violated 
the law.73 
68. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968); 
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (W.D. Wash. 1968). 
69. See, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc., v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 
1179, I 185 (8th Cir. 1979); Note, supra note 23, at 703. 
70. See text at notes 77-83 i'!fra. 
71. Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1968). See also Cooper Stevedoring 
Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (contribution among jointly negligent tortfeasors 
allowed because " ... a more 'equal distribution of justice' can best be achieved by ameliorat-
ing the common-Jaw rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one of two 
wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been equally or more to 
blame"). 
72. Consider the case of a small distributor unable to resist a large manufacturer's pressure 
to join a resale price conspiracy. A plaintiff injured by the conspiracy may prefer to sue the 
distributor, fearing that the manufacturer's resources would make it too formidable an oppo-
nent in court. 
73. See note 156 i'!fra; Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 
79,699, 79,707 (10th Cir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 
1979). See also Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
835 (1957). 
In a sense, Olson Farms was forced to pay more than its "share" of the damages, since the 
recovery included damages attributable to sales of the other violators. But joint and several 
liability is imposed upon antitrust defendants for the very reason that violator's wrongdoing 
was necessary to the combination or conspiracy. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International 
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968) (White, J., concurring); W. PROSSER, supra note I,§ 47, 
at 296-97. Although Olson Farms allegedly purchased only eleven percent of the eggs sold by 
904 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:890 
Olson Farms dramatically illustrates how the denial of contribu-
tion can result in an unfair allocation of damages among joint viola-
tors. Although Olson Farms was the smallest of the price-fixers by 
sales, the plaintiffs sued that company alone for treble damages. The 
judgment Olson Farms eventually paid amounted to twenty-four 
times the damages immediately caused by the company's egg 
purchases. 
Concerns for allocative unfairness should not be dismissed by ap-
pealing to the rationale for joint and several liability under the anti-
trust laws. Joint and several liability enables an antitrust plaintiff to 
recover all his damages from any one joint violator because each 
violator is deemed to have been a material cause of the damages.74 
Joint and several liability need not, however, be applied so as to 
punish a defendant by requiring that he alone bear the loss for all 
violators.75 Joint and several liability probably seeks only to ensure 
that the plaintiff is fully compensated for his loss, regardless of 
whether he is able to name all those responsible for the loss in his 
suit.76 There is a fundamental difference between saying a plaintiff 
can state a sufficient case by suing any one violator, and saying that 
the loss must remain entirely upon a defendant so singled out. This 
latter result, and the allocative unfairness which accompanies it, is 
solely the result of a rule barring contribution. 
2. Uefairness in P!aint!fjs Choice of a .Defendant 
The unfairness of requiring a single violator to bear the entire 
burden of a judgment may be aggravated by a plaintiffs improper 
motives for selecting a particular defendant. Where there is joint 
the plaintiffs, without its cooperation the conspiracy might have broken up with no injury to 
the plaintiffs. In that sense, Olson Farms was responsible for the plaintiffs' entire loss. 
The percentage of sales or profits made by each violator may be an appropriate measure of 
contribution shares, however. See note 171 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See Perma Life Muffler, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1967) 
(White, J., concurring); W. PROSSER, supra note I, at 296-97. 
75. Rights to contribution coexist with joint and several liability in many states. See Note, 
Contribution Among Joint Tor!feasors, 12 GA. L. REV. 553, 572-73 & nn.102-05 (1978). 
76. The chief benefit of joint and several liability in tort actions is to help the plaintiff 
recover full compensation for his injury in a single judgment. It allows the plaintiff to limit his 
suit or the execution of a joint judgment to the violator or violators best able to pay. See 
Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence al Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF, L. REV, 
239, 251 (1976). A plaintiff forced to sue each violator separately for a portion of his loss 
would risk an incomplete recovery: even if he could overcome the obstacles to obtaining and 
executing a judgment against each violator, the sum of these separate judgments might fall 
short of total loss. A rule allowing contribution would still permit the plaintiff to recover his 
entire loss in a single judgment while enabling a sole defendant to spread the burden of this 
judgment among other violators. See Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Negligence in Flor• 
ida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 790 (1974). 
The rule of joint and several liability may also deter violators more effectively than a rule 
that would limit a joint violator's liability to a portion of the plaintifrs loss. Allowing contri-
butions would erase this difference. Whether contribution would decrease deterrence, and 
whether such a decrease is undesirable, is discussed at text accompanying notes 101-16 i'!fra. 
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and several liability, a plaintiff may use any of a number of criteria 
in deciding whom to sue. He may consider the convenience of suing 
a violator, the strength of evidence against that violator, and the vio-
lator's ability to satisfy a judgment. Two criteria for a plaintiff's 
choice of defendant seem particularly troublesome. First, a plaintiff 
may choose a competitor for suit over other joint violators due to an 
anticompetitive motive. Second, some joint violators may escape be-
ing sued because of a special relationship with the plaintiff.77 
These last two motives are arguably present in the Professional 
Beauty case. Professional may have chosen to sue National rather 
than the larger and allegedly more culpable La Maur because of a 
desire to maintain good business relations with the manufacturer 
which supplied its needs.78 National may also have been singled out 
for suit because it was Professional's competitor in the sales of La 
Maur products in Minnesota.79 
Some have implied that the improper motives present in Profes-
sional Beauty occur infrequently in antitrust litigation. 80 Although 
cases .of 'collusive' activity are very rarely recorded in reported deci-
sions, 81 it nevertheless seems likely that plaintiffs in most antitrust 
77. The relationship may take a variety of forms. The plaintiff may be a blood relative of 
one of the potential defendants. See Norfolk & Southern R.R. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 
678 (1924). The plaintiff may own a company that is one of the potential defendants. See 
Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn Rys. Co., ll0 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924). One of the 
potential defendants may have bribed the plaintiff with either money or testimony against 
coconspirators. See Leflar, supra note 3, at 137. This last relationship is not as horrendous as 
Leflar indicates, for it is really the equivalent of a settlement agreement in which a defendant 
exchanges money and access to its files for a release of liability. 
To speak of these relationships as "collusive,'' see, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. 
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 186 (8th Cir. 1979); SENATE REPORT, supra note 
53, at I, is not helpful. Collusion is a secret agreement between two parties, whose interests 
apparently conflict, to make use of the forms and proceedings oflaw to defraud a third person. 
See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 26 S.W. 599 (1894). Regardless of a plaintiff's 
motives, an antitrust defendant is not legally wronged when the plaintiff agrees, or decides on 
his own, not to sue a joint violator. See text at note 83 i'!fra. 
Improper motives may result in more than just unfairness to a party selected for suit. To 
the extent that a violator can predict his omission as a defendant, either because he knows he 
can effectively threaten the plaintiff or because the plaintiff will otherwise not wish to sue him, 
he will not be deterred from the unlawful behavior. A right to contribution, however, assures 
that if the plaintiff decides to sue any violator, that violator can force other favored or feared 
violators to share the loss. If contribution were allowed, the plaintiff would have to choose 
between foregoing any recovery and exposing the favored or feared .violator to liability. 
78. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d ll79, 1185 
(8th Cir. 1979). 
79. 594 F.2d at ll8I. 
80. According to Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, Professional Beauty raised 
"unusual" questions of inequity. 923 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (July 19, 
1979). 
81. All the literature discussing contribution in the contexts of tort law, securities, and 
antitrust has cited only two cases of"collusive activity," by plaintiffs, both occurring more than 
fifty years ago. See note 77 supra. Professor Leflar suggested that although a record of collu-
sion rarely appears in reported decisions, "It is common knowledge that such undercover deal-
ings occur constantly in perSonal injury cases. . • ." Leflar, supra note 3, at 137 n.35. 
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suits consider their relationship to violators as competitor or cus-
tomer before selecting a defendant.82 Judge Thornberry's claim that 
a victim of improper motives may have an independent cause of ac-
tion is unfounded.83 Since contribution rights enable a victim of im-
proper motives to spread the loss among joint violators, this type of 
unfairness could be remedied by a liberal contribution rule. 
3. Unfairness in the Coercion of Settlements 
Joint antitrust violators may suffer the unfairness of the no-con-
tribution rule even in cases that never go to trial. An astute plain-
tiff's attorney can threaten to sue a smaller company alone for treble 
damages attributable to the sales of much larger joint violators.84 A 
company faced with this massive liability may have little choice but 
to settle and to surrender its opportunity to go to trial on the merits 
of its case.85 Antitrust practitioners have spoken bitterly of this un-
82. The Utah egg producers may well have considered Olson Farm's small size, and hence 
the relative unimportance of having it continue to buy eggs, in their decision to sue Olson 
Farms rather than their more important customers. During the trial of the original plaintiffs' 
suit against Olson Farms, one of the defense attorneys asked one of the plaintiffs why another 
more important violator had not been sued: 
Q. You didn't sue Countryside in this case? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Whynot? 
A. For the simple reason that we were doing business with them, and they was taking 
[sic] our eggs. And it's pretty hard when you have 1,200 cases on the market to be 
dropped. 
Trial Record at 4632-33, Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). 
83. A single lawsuit with an anticompetitive motive may be a violation of Sherman Act§ 2 
within the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Colorado Petroleum Mar-
keters Assn. v. The Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979); Cyborg Sys., Inc. v. 
Management Science America, Inc., (1978-1] Trade Cas. 73,914 (N.D. Ill. 1978), but the suit 
must be baseless for the victim to gain relief. The only other independent actions a victim of 
collusion might bring would sound in tort. An action for wrongful civil proceedings would not 
lie because the victim cannot show termination of the collusive plaintiffs suit in his favor. See 
W. PROSSER, supra note I, § 120 at 853. An action for abuse of process would also fail, be-
cause "there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the 
process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Id.,§ 121 at 857. 
84. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 105 (statement of Harold Kohn). 
Plaintiffs' attorneys claim that small defendants are infrequently coerced into settlement, 
Id., at 97, 104 (statement of Harold Kohn). This is refuted, however, by a plaintiffs' lawyer's 
testimony in the Senate Hearings. When one defendant's attorney refused to settle in a suit 
involving fifteen companies, the plaintiffs attorney told him, 
All right, it is obvious that you are holding up everybody else from settling this litiga-
tion. You leave. We won't settle with you. We are going to settle with everybody 
else .... [W]e are going to go after you alone, not only for the damages that you caused 
but for everybody else's damages. . . . Goodbye; . . . we are not going to talk to you 
anymore. 
Id. at 54 (statement of David Shapiro). Within half an hour the threatened defendant had 
settled. Id. 
85. See ADA Report, supra note 13, at E-1; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga• 
tion, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd. without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. 
granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 
1980) (No. 79-972). Cf. Durham & Dibble, Cert!fication: A Practical .Device for Early Screen-
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fairness: 
In the nearly half century of my practice I have never seen a single 
other circumstance which has created the cynicism at the bar that has 
arisen from the settlement negotiations in these cases .... Nor have I 
ever seen before anything to equal the consternation of unbelieving 
businessmen, large and small, when told that the law literally does not 
provide them with a process for determining the merits of their de-
fense; that any settlement within their purse, as a practical matter, may 
be their only chance for survival.86 
The coercion of settlements in joint antitrust violation cases has 
been refined into a litigation device known as the "whipsaw." Whip-
sawing is the process by which lawyers for class action plaintiffs ne-
gotiate settlements with different defendants in stages, charging 
progressively more for settlement at each stage. Under present law, 
when one antitrust def end ant settles, other defendants remain liable 
for three times all damages incurred by the plaintiff minus only the 
amount received in settlement. 87 Plaintiffs typically settle cheaply 
with smaller defendants early in the litigation, 88 using the money 
thus raised to finance the litigation against remaining defendants. 
Defendants who settle early in the whipsaw usually pay far less than 
their share of the trebled liability - whether computed according to 
market shares or on some other basis89 - and non-settling defend-
ants remain liable for the difference. As increasing numbers of de-
fendants settle, leaving an ever-smaller pool of non-settling 
defendants to share the remaining potential liability,90 plaintiffs are 
ing of Spurious Antitrust Litigation, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 302-03; Handler, The Shift From 
Substanlire lo Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 CoLUM L. REV. I, 9 (1971) (threat 
to small defendant of large litigation costs). The Supreme Court has recently expressed con-
cern that some defendants may be forced to abandon a meritorious defense. See Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (listing this as one of several considerations in 
refusing to allow a circuit court to immediately review decertification of a class by a district 
court). A small company in a capital-intensive industry, aware that a complaint naming it as 
the sole defendant in a large antitrust conspiracy suit would cause its credit sources to dry up, 
may have no choice but to settle. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 15. 
86. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 
199, 207 (1976). 
87. If two violators caused a plaintiff $100,000 in damages, and the plaintiff settles with 
one prior to trial for $25,000, the remaining violator is liable for $100,000 trebled minus 
$25,000, or $275,000. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 344 
(1971); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1964) (plu-
rality opinion). 
88. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 95, 97, 106 (statement of Harold Kohn). But see 
Senate Hearings, id. at 68 (statement of Donald Kempf describing a suit in which one of the 
largest defendants settled first). 
89. See notes 170-72 infra and accompanying text. 
90. Until judgment is executed, a non-settling defendant theoretically risks the possibility 
that he may at any time become solely liable for the total outstanding liability: the plaintiff 
may suddenly drop his case against all other remaining joint defendants, subject to approval 
by the court in a class action, or, if the plaintiff recovers a joint judgment, he may choose to 
execute it solely against the particular defendant. Practically, however, the defendant knows 
that if the plaintiff recovers a joint judgment, he will usually choose to execute it against all the 
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able to exact progressively higher settlements.91 By the latter stages 
of the whipsaw, a company directly responsible for only a small frac-
tion of a plaintiffs damages may alone face liability for damages 
caused by an entire industry.92 As one court observed, "[t]hat this 
possibility is inherently coercive is indisputable."93 
A rule allowing antitrust contribution against settling defendants 
would put an end to whipsawing,94 as would a rule reducing a plain-
tiffs claim by the contribution share a settling defendant would have 
had to pay if he had not settled.95 It is each non-settling defendant's 
growing share of liability that gives teeth to the plaintiff's threat at 
each stage of settlement. If claims for contribution against settling 
defendants were allowed, or if a plaintiffs claim were reduced by the 
contribution share of a settling defendant, the threat would evapo-
rate. 
It may not be too much to say that a desire on the part of large 
defendants' attorneys to end whipsawing, and a similar desire by 
class action plaintiffs' lawyers to maintain it, is the real inspiration 
for a controversy which has been couched in the broader language of 
contribution. Whipsawing has been successful and profitable for 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers, and enormously costly for corporate 
defendants. Settlements achieved through whipsawing are inequita-
ble both because defendants may have no practical opportunity to go 
to trial on the merits, and because defendants often pay damages 
attributable to those settling before them. 
non-settling defendants. As that group shrinks with each settlement, a non-settling defendant 
knows that his likely actual share of the remaining liability increases. He is therefore willing 
to pay a higher price for settlement. 
91. Suppose, for example, that an antitrust plaintiff alleges $1,000,000 in damages caused 
by five defendants, each with a 20% market share. Suppose also that each defendant, having 
computed the probability of an unfavorable judgment and the relative costs of trying and 
settling the case, is willing to settle for 50% of his share of the potential liability. Defendant A, 
the first defendant approached for settlement, settles for $300,000 - 50% of his 1/5 share of 
the potential $3,000,000 judgment. The second settling defendant, defendant B, would be will-
ing to pay $337,500, figuring that he risks a 1/4 share of the remaining $2,700,000 potential 
liability. Or he may fear that if he does not settle quickly, the three remaining nonsettling 
defendants will settle for $400,000 each, leaving him to face alone a $1,500,000 potential liabil-
ity. To avoid this later, more expensive settling position, B may be willing to settle for up to 
$750,000 - 50% of the potential $1,500,000 liability. The fear of being the last one to settle 
thus motivates prompt as well as large settlements. 
92. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), q/f d. 
without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. 
v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). For a description 
of the mechanics of the whipsaw in the Container litigation, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 
53, at 14-16. 
93. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), q/fd. 
without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. 
v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). 
94. Such a rule, however, would deter violators from settling. See text at notes 121-25 
i,!fra. 
95. This rule also has its drawbacks. See text at notes 126-30 i,!fra. 
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Some practitioners have argued that fairness concerns in the con-
tribution debate are unwarranted because defendants can use shar-
ing agreements with joint violators to prevent whipsawing and unfair 
allocation of loss.96 A sharing agreement contractually allocates lia-
bility for an antitrust violation among the defendants. It typically 
provides that, should one of the parties to the agreement settle before 
judgment at trial, that party will still be liable to the other parties for 
its specified share of damages minus the sum paid in settlement. 
Sharing agreements, like contribution rights, enable defendants to 
spread the loss among themselves. 
Sharing agreements are not a perfect substitute for contribution 
rights, however. Although sharing agreements are fairly common 
among larger antitrust defendants in class action suits,97 in many 
cases - especially those involving large numbers of defendants -
the defendants may not be able to reach an agreement.98 In addi-
tion, a court might refuse to enforce antitrust sharing agreements on 
the grounds that they hinder settlement and reduce deterrence.99 
The existence of sharing agreements therefore does little to ease the 
fairness concerns raised by a rule barring contribution. 
If our only concern in antitrust suits involving joint violators 
were to achieve fair outcomes, the case for contribution would be 
unassailable. The rule barring contribution allows plaintiffs, 
through their nearly absolute power to allocate liability, to force vio-
lators to pay more than their fair share of damages, to single out 
competitors as defendants, and to coerce settlements from innocent 
96. See ABA Report, supra note 13, at E-2. 
97. See Letter from Carl Steinhouse to Michigan Law Review Association (Oct. 22, 1979) 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review); Letter from Harold Kohn to Michigan Law Review 
Association (Nov. 9, 1979) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Mr. Steinhouse is a former 
director of the Great Lakes Field Office of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division; Mr. 
Kohn is a prominent antitrust plaintiffs' attorney. 
98. See Paul, supra note 2, at 83; Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 55, 85; SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 53, at 2; Letter from Darryl Snider to Michigan Law Review Association 
(Aug. 20, 1980) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Violators not named in the plaintiff's 
suit will not assume contractual liability because the no-contribution rule effectively frees them 
from fear of tort liability. Even defendants who are named in suits may refuse to join in a 
sharing agreement because of a tactical belief that they will pay less by settling with the plain-
tiff than by contracting with codefendants. See Analysis, Contribution - Fairness or Folly in 
Antitrust Litigation?, 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) B-1, B-4 (June 6, 1979). 
99. The Second Circuit has refused to enforce an agreement completely shifting liability to 
one of several violators in a securities case. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 
1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (refusing enforcement because of 
concern for the deterrent policy of the securities laws). In securities cases parties are free to 
contract as to their contribution shares only if the contracts do not violate public policy. See 
Note, supra note 16, at 1313 & n.333. Agreements that force a settling defendant to pay further 
damages to codefendants after settlement might substantially reduce the incentive to settle. 
Both the ABA Statute, see ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at § (h), and the Bayh Bill, see 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 2, assume the legality of sharing agreements. 
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defendants. But equity is not costless.100 Greater fairness must be 
balanced with the effects of contribution on other antitrust policy 
goals. 
B. .Deterrence 
The primary purpose behind private treble damage suits is to en-
courage plaintiffs to act as "private attorneys general" in enforcing 
the antitrust laws. 101 By augmenting the limited resources available 
for government prosecutions, this private enforcement encourages 
compliance with the law. 102 Courts considering whether to allow 
contribution have inquired whether contribution rights would am-
plify or diminish the deterrent effect of private treble damage suits. 
Echoing the reasoning of other courts103 and commentators, 104 the 
Eighth Circuit decided that allowing contribution would better deter 
violators than barring contribution. 105 The Fifth Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion.106 This Section first explains why the Fifth Cir-
cuit has the better of the deterrence argument. It then examines 
whether the increased measure of deterrence achieved by barring 
contribution is desirable as a matter of antitrust policy. 
There are three reasons why allowing contribution will reduce 
the deterrent effect of private antitrust suits. First, a rule allowing 
contribution would probably make large class actions - in which 
whipsawing is common - less attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs' 
lawyers. If a primary goal of allowing contribution is to prevent co-
ercion and whipsawing of settlements, such a rule will inevitably dis-
courage suits which are at present :financed by these techniques. 107 
Second, because most corporate managers are probably risk-averse, 
preferring the certainty of a small loss (with contribution) to a small 
possiblity of a large loss (sole liability without contribution), they 
100. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case 
far Treble .Damages, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 329, 353-54 (1974). 
101. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972). 
102. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
103. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Liggett & Meyers Inc. 
v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In these cases, all implying rights of 
contribution under the securities laws, the reasoning that allowing contribution, and hence 
distributing the costs of a violation among all the violators, will increase deterrence figures 
prominently. This reasoning may have to be reconsidered in view of its rejection by the Fifth 
Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
104. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 9; Corbett, supra note 2, at 137. 
105. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F. 2d 1179, 
1185 (8th Cir. 1979). 
106. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
101. See text at notes 84-96 supra. 
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will be more deterred by a rule which prevents dispersion of dam-
ages among violators. 108 Finally, to the extent that potential plain-
tiffs would refrain from bringing suits because of the complexity 
engendered by contribution, 109 allowing contributions would dimin-
ish deterrence. 
This conclusion does not justify an absolute bar to contribution, 
however, because maxiroizinr; deterrence is not an unqualified goal 
of antitrust policy. Limits are placed on the severity of punishment 
for violation of the antitrust laws not because of a lessened desire for 
compliance, but because unlimited deterrence entails greater costs 
than society is willing to bear. The increased deterrence attributable 
to a rule barring contribution entails not only the social costs of its 
unfairness, but also economic costs in its effects on economically de-
sirable conduct. Excessive penalties can cause businesses to shun 
competitive practices lying close to the borderline of impermissible 
conduct - to avoid price competition out of fear that it may be 
found to be predatory, for example, or to refuse to release price in-
formation for fear that it may be interpreted as price-:fixing.110 The 
danger of overdeterrence suggests that there is an optimal level of 
deterrence that antitrust remedies should achieve, 111 a level that var-
ies among types of violations by their gravity and their resemblance 
to competitive conduct. 112 
It is unclear whether our present system of antitrust remedies 
reaches, overshoots, or falls short of the optimal level of deterrence. 
One could reasonably argue that the optimal level is already ex-
ceeded for some violations and not yet reached for others; that price 
discrimination is overdeterred and blatant horizontal price-fixing not 
punished enough.113 One's opinion about the relation between the 
present level of deterrence and the optimal level affects one's belief 
108. As the Fifth Circuit suggests, 604 F.2d at 901 & n.8, economic theory strongly sup-
ports this conclusion. Economic theory and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of 
the "risk-averse" corporate manager are summarized in K. ELIZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTI-
TRUST REMEDIES 126-29 (1976). Although much of the economic literature concerns large 
corporations, there is reason to believe that smaller companies will be even more risk-averse 
than large ones. See Note, In Pari .Delicto and the .Deterrence ef Antitrust Violations, 62 MINN. 
L. REV. 59, 77-78 (1977). The implications of risk-averseness for antitrust policy are explored. 
in Austin, Negative Jfffects of Treble .Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strat-
egy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353, 1357-66. 
109. See text at notes 143-46 infra. 
110. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW§ 309c (1978); R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 78 (1978); SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 18. The Supreme Court has 
noted the particular danger of overdeterrence when penalties are applied to unintentional vio-
lators. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 & n.17 (1978). 
111. If there is some level of deterrence that is excessive because it chills competitive be-
havior, there must be some limit to the desirable level of antitrust deterrence. 
112. See Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (testimony of John Shenefield describing 
greater danger of overdeterrence in monopolization than in price-fixing cases). 
113. See R. BORK, supra note l 10, at 382-402. 
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in the appropriateness of allowing contribution. If, as some sug-
gest, 114 we are already overdeterring some violators, the reduced de-
terrence resulting from giving those violators a right to contribution 
would promote procompetitive antitrust policy. 
Admittedly, this analysis poses more questions than it answers. 
It does suggest that courts and legislators have been wrong in asking 
only how contribution would affect deterrence, without further in-
quiring whether that effect would be desirable. Policymakers need 
first to determine where present levels of deterrence stand relative to 
the optimum 115 before deciding whether deterrence weighs for or 
against contribution.116 
C. Promotion of Settlement 
Courts seek to encourage pre-trial settlement of private antitrust 
suits because such a compromise lessens the expense of litigation for 
courts, plaintiffs, and defendants alike. 117 The most common argu-
ment against allowing contribution is that it will discourage settle-
ment.118 The force of this argument depends upon whether the 
contribution rule (1) allows actions for contribution against other vi-
olators who have previously settled with the plaintiff, (2) forbids con-
tribution actions against settling parties and reduces the plaintiff's 
claim against the remaining defendants by only the amount received 
114. See generally R. BORK supra note 110. 
115. There is limited evidence that one set of policy-makers, the Supreme Court, may be-
lieve we have already allowed private remedies to overshoot the optimal deterrence level. See 
Reiter v. Sonotone Inc., 442 U.S. 330, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977). 
116. The level of deterrence could also be affected by the broad spectrum of antitrust bills 
now in Congress. For a brief summary of pending legislation as of 1979, see Regnery, Antitrust 
Reform: The Congressional Prognosis, 15 TRIAL, no. 4, 29 (April 1979). 
117. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Intl., Inc., 455 F.2d 
770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 835 (1957); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), '!!fd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1978). Antitrust suits frequently terminate in settlement. 
See Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNl!LL L. 
Rev. I, 6-8 (1976). Of the 1,307 private antitrust actions terminated in 1978, only eight percent 
reached trial. Five hundred thirty-seven were terminated with no court action, and 395 more 
were terminated before pre-trial procedures began. See ADMINISTRATIVI! OFFICI! OF THI! 
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS Table C-4 (1978). It is 
reasonable to infer that a large percentage of these terminations involved settlements between 
the parties. See Note, supra note 108, at 60 n.8. 
Although settlements are desirable, not all rules facilitating settlement will automatically 
be beneficial. Settlement is not an absolute goal, and "[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify 
a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court 
accommodations." United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975) (refusing 
to retain an admiralty rule equally dividing damages without regard to fault). 
118. See, e.g., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1968); In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), '!!fd without published opinion, 
606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 
U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-
1] Trade Cas. 72,110, 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 39. 
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in settlement, 119 or (3) forbids such actions but provides that the 
plaintiff will give up a larger portion of his claim.120 This Section 
discusses th.e effect of each of these rules on parties' incentives to 
settle. 
Holding settling defendants liable for contribution 121 would di-
minish their incentive to settle. One reason defendants settle rather 
than litigate the merits of disputes is that they prefer to avoid the 
uncertainties of trial and to proceed with their normal business. 122 
In a word, they desire :finality. An antitrust settlement typically re-
leases the defendant from all further liability to the plaintiff, 123 and, 
where contribution is barred, the settling defendant enjoys peace of 
mind in the knowledge that the litigation is behind him. Where con-
tribution against settling defendants is allowed, settlement may not 
bring such repose. A joint defendant who settles with the plaintiff 
will still be subject to suits for contribution brought by the remaining 
defendants. 124 This chilling effect on defendants' incentive to settle 
is a primary reason courts have denied claims seeking contribution 
from settling antitrust defendants. 125 
Conceivably, a rule allowing contribution could exempt settling 
defendants. Such a rule would provide relief in cases such as Profes-
sional Beauty, Abraham Construction, or Olson Farms, where no vio-
lators settled with the plaintiff. The rule would not affect the 
defendant's ":finality" interest in settling, and hence would do noth-
ing to discourage settlement. But neither would it remedy some of 
the unfairness from which demands for contribution have arisen. 
Whipsawing and coercion of settlements would remain feasible 
under this rule. Diluting the contribution remedy with an exemption 
for settling defendants will reduce its effectiveness as a cure for un-
fairness. 
To preserve the contribution rule's power to prevent unfairness 
while protecting a defendant's :finality interest in settling, the pro-
119. See text at note 87 supra. 
120. An intriguing possibility beyond the scope of this Note is that of contribution actions 
by settling defendants against unnamed coconspirators or non-settling defendants. Such a 
possibility is not necessarily barred by the Bayh Bill, but is forbidden under the ABA Statute. 
ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (e). A settling defendant is allowed to sue for contribution 
in certain circumstances under the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT§ 4(b). See generally 
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 307-10. 
121. Several courts have allowed contribution claims against settling securities law viola-
tors. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272-74 (D. Del. 1978); Altman v. Liberty 
Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
122. See Note, Se/1/ement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rev. 486 (1966). 
123. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
124. To correct this problem, the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was 
revised in 1955 to prohibit contribution against settling defendants. See UNIFORM CONTRIBU-
TION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT§ 4(b) and Commissioners' Co=ent. 
125. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979). 
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posed contribution statutes have combined a bar to actions against 
settling defendants with provisions reducing the remaining defend-
ants' liability by an amount that will usually be larger than the 
amount paid in settlement. 126 Under the Bayh Bill, the plaintiff's 
claims against non-settling defendants are reduced by "treble the ac-
tual damages attributable to the settling [defendant's] sales or 
purchases of goods or service."127 The ABA Statute reduces claims 
in proportion to the relative responsibility of the settling defendant 
for the plaintiff's damages. 128 These rules preserve a defendant's 
finality interest in settling while assuring fairness to non-settling de-
fendants. The plaintiff, however, must give up a considerably larger 
portion of his claim under these rules than under present law, 129 and 
will therefore have less incentive to settle. The plaintiff's sacrifice is 
further aggravated under the ABA Statute, because he cannot pre-
dict the "relative responsibility" of the settling defendant with cer-
tainty before an adjudication of liability at trial. 130 This uncertainty 
will further discourage plaintiffs from settling, or at the least will 
delay settlement until the later stages of litigation, when the benefits 
of settlement are greatly diminished. 
Despite its tendency to discourage plaintiffs from settling, claim 
reduction - itself a complex and hotly debated issue within the con-
tribution controversy131 - may be appropriate in many antitrust 
cases.132 Plaintiffs will still have strong incentives to settle under a 
contribution rule exempting settling defendants and requiring claim 
reduction. By settling, plaintiffs will be rapidly compensated and 
will avoid further litigation expenses. Plaintiffs will also avoid the 
risk of an unfavorable judgment at trial. The strength of these incen-
tives is illustrated by recent settlement agreements in which plaintiffs 
assume any potential contribution liability of settling defendants. 133 
126. At present the plaintiff's judgment against remaining defendants is reduced by the 
amount paid by the settling defendant. See note 87 supra. 
127. Bayh Bill, supra note 12, at § 41(b). If the settlement agreement provides that the 
plaintiff will reduce his claim by a larger amount, or if the amount paid in settlement is larger, 
then the plaintiff's claim is reduced by such larger amount. Id. 
A district court following Professional Beauty used an apparently similar method. See Lit-
tle Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,059 at 77,251 (E.D. Ark. 
1979) (letter opinion) (releasing "non-settling defendants from any joint and several liability 
they may have for any overcharges attributable to Settling Defendant's sales to the Settlement 
Class or otherwise"). See also note 9 supra. 
128. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§§ (f), (g). For an explanation of "relative responsi-
bility," see note 170 infra. 
129. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. 
130. See Minority Report, supra note 61, at§ B(l). 
131. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 31-32. 
132. The best solution may be to allow courts to fashion appropriate relief - be it claim 
reduction o; contribution against settling defendant - when the problem arises. See text at 
notes 171-74 infra. 
133. See note 9 supra. 
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D. Reduced Complexity of Litigation 
Private antitrust suits are often extremely complex affairs, involv-
ing numerous parties, years of negotiations and litigation, and so-
phisticated legal and economic issues. 134 The Supreme Court has 
noted the concern for the heavy burden these suits impose upon the 
courts. 135 Attorney General Civiletti has complained that antitrust 
litigation has become too lengthy, too costly, and too complicated. 136 
In view of the concern over the present level of complexity, it is not 
surprising that courts are reluctant to inject a new class of claims into 
antitrust cases. Contribution, it is feared, will "open a Pandora's box 
of procedural problems."137 The added complexity engendered -by 
contribution claims will impose varying burdens on courts, plaintiffs, 
and defendants. 
Allowing contribution will increase the amount of time that 
courts devote to antitrust litigation. Judges will have to adjudicate 
claims routinely barred or never brought in the past. In ruling on 
these claims, courts will have to develop rules to resolve such com-
plex issues as measurement of contribution shares, the relationship 
of contribution to settlement, and claim reduction. 138 Experience 
under the securities laws, which contain express contribution provi-
sions, warns that large numbers of new claims for contribution can 
be expected should antitrust contribution be allowed. 139 
134. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979); In re 
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd without published 
opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract 
Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). 
135. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (Burger, C.J.), 345-46 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (1979). 
136. See Address by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, American Bar Association Sec-
tion of Litigation (Chicago, Nov. 10, 1979). 
137. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 
1979). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 52 (testimony of David Shapiro). 
Fears that contribution will create procedural complexity have not been unique to antitrust 
law. More than forty years ago, when express contribution provisions were included in the 
securities acts, Professor (later Justice) Douglas complained of the "unseemly, inefficient, and 
expensive" spectacle that would result. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 
43 YALE L.J. 171, 180-81 (1933). 
138. Some of these issues may be decided by Congress. See Bayh Bill, supra note 12. 
Courts are still struggling with these issues in securities suits. See generally Note, supra note 
16. Contribution among defendants in private securities actions is expressly allowed under 
section l l(f) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976), and sections 9(e) and 
18(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e), r(a) (1976). Contribution 
rights have been implied under several other sections of the Acts. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 
601 F.2d 330, 331-34 (7th Cir. 1979). 
139. There were few claims for contribution under the securities laws prior to the late 
1960s. After the courts began to void contractual indemnification agreements in securities 
cases, there was a burgeoning of contribution claims. See Note, supra note 16, at 1256. Since 
indemnification is barred in antitrust cases, see Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National 
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 186-87 (8th Cir. 1979), it is reasonable to expect a similar 
flurry of contribution claims in antitrust litigation. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), ajfd without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 
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Plaintiffs will also suffer from the increased complexity of litiga-
tion if third party claims or cross claims for contribution are allowed. 
Each new contribution claim will expand the scope of the plaintiff's 
suit, delay his recovery, and add to his litigation expenses. 140 This 
hardship could be alleviated by severance of contribution claims 
from the plaintiff's suit, but circuit judges differ as to whether discre-
tionary severance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)141 is 
an adequate remedy. 142 
Whether or not contribution's benefits justify forcing courts and 
plaintiffs to incur increased expenses, one can argue that the com-
plexity engendered by contribution will discourage plaintiffs from 
bringing suits, thus lessening the threat of private antitrust enforce-
ment. "Aware that litigation may spiral out of their control, it is 
foreseeable that some plaintiffs will decide to forego a legitimate 
cause of action."143 This reasoning may be challenged on two levels. 
First, the conclusion itself is questionable. Powerful incentives to 
bring private actions (including trebling of damages and recovery of 
1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. 
June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972), for a description of the multitude of potential claims in a class 
action involving numerous defendants. 
140. It has been suggested that defendants might abuse contribution rights by filing contri-
bution claims against numerous parties who may be only remotely connected to the alleged 
violation. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 
1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). District courts would probably be able to detect and to deal with this 
problem should it arise. 
141. The text of section (b) reads as follows: 
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or 
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate 
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue 
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, al-
ways preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment 
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States. 
FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b). 
142. Compare Judge Stephenson's opinion in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National 
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1979) ("district courts have the ability to 
sever issues and parties if the need arises"), and Judge Morgan's dissent in Wilson P. Abraham 
Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1979) ("I simply cannot believe 
that the discretionary nature of the Rule 42(b) separate trials provision would discourage an 
antitrust plaintiff from seeking treble damages"), with Judge Hanson's dissent in Professional 
Beauty, 594 F.2d at I 190 (stating favorable uses of district court discretion are a "mere possi-
bility"), and Judge Thomberry's opinion in Abraham Construction, 604 F.2d at 905 (quoting 
Judge Hanson). 
Only three securities cases have discussed severance of a contribution claim under rule 
42(b). In one case the claims were severed to protect the plaintiff's interest. Sherlee Land v. 
Co=onwealth United Corp., (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 93,749 
at 93,273 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In a second case the claims were so intertwined as to make sever• 
ance impossible. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 
F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A third, in dicta, claimed that there could be severance whenever 
the trial judge believes it to be in the interest of orderliness and simplification of the issues. 
Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
143. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, I 190 
(8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting in part). 
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attorney fees) 144 would remain, despite the added complexity 
threatened by contribution. As the Eighth Circuit observed, contri-
bution provisions in the securities laws have not deterred the bring-
ing of many private suits that are as complex as private antitrust 
suits. 145 Second, the underlying assumption - that a reduction in 
the deterrence of antitrust violations is undesirable - is not always 
valid. As noted earlier, 146 there may be some classes of violations 
that are already overdeterred. 
Even defendants, the intended beneficiaries of a rule allowing 
contribution, may find that the rule makes litigation more complex 
and expensive. Not only will they bear the additional costs of litigat-
ing the contribution claims, 147 but they will also have difficulty 
agreeing on joint defense efforts. When all the defendants in a pri-
vate suit can agree on a common defense strategy cooperatively, 
there is a considerable saving of court and attorney time in litigation. 
A joint defense is unlikely when defendants are vigorously prosecut-
ing claims for contribution against each other.148 Proponents of con-
tribution have impliedly acknowledged that joint defense 
agreements will be less frequent if contribution is allowed. 149 
Policymakers considering the antitrust contribution issue need to 
give careful attention to the problem of increased complexity. 
Courts, plaintiffs, and defendants already expend vast amounts of 
resources litigating private antitrust suits. Contribution rules should 
be devised with a view to minimizing any increase in these costs. 
Ill. BALANCING CONFLICTING GOALS: THE SEARCH FOR AN 
.APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION RULE 
Fairness is advanced by allowing contribution; settlement and 
procedural simplicity are advanced by barring it. Deterrence consid-
erations may argue for or against contribution, depending on the ad-
equacy of antitrust penalties imposed for the type of practice at issue. 
144. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
145. Professional Beauty Supply Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184-
85 (8th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 16, at 1257. 
146. See text at notes 110-14 supra. 
147. The type of contribution rule adopted can itself affect the complexity of contribution 
claims. See text at note 162 i,!fra. 
148. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), 
qffd. without published opinion, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Westvaco 
Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3820 (U.S. June 16, 1980) (No. 79-972). Plaintiffs 
may therefore benefit if contribution is allowed, since defendants will be attempting to prove 
plaintiffs' claims against each other. Of course, where contribution liability is measured by 
market share, rather than relative responsibility of the conspirators, defendants are much less 
likely to abandon joint defense efforts and to quarrel with each other, since market shares are 
more easily and objectively ascertained. 
149. See ABA Report, supra note 13, at 16. 
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Thus, courts and other rulemakers deciding whether to permit con-
tribution cannot simultaneously advance all antitrust policy goals. 
Rulemakers have reacted to the contribution dilemma by formu-
lating three types of rules, each of which implies a balancing of pol-
icy goals. Some have stated absolute, unqualified rules, either 
allowing or forbidding contribution in all cases. Others have created 
"bright-line" rules, which look to the presence or absence of a single 
factor (such as intent or price-fixing) in deciding when to grant con-
tribution rights. Finally, the Eighth Circuit has elected to let courts 
look at multiple factors on a case-by-case basis. This Part of the 
Note examines the balance of policy goals struck by each of these 
three types of rules - absolute, bright-line, and case-by-case - in 
order to determine which rule is most desirable. 
A. Absolute Contribution Rules 
An absolute contribution rule either bars contribution in all 
cases, as in Abraham Construction, or allows it in all cases, as under 
the ABA Statute. An absolute rule makes sense if a balancing of 
policies in the vast majority of cases would dictate identical results, 
and the costs of screening out the occasional deviant case exceed the 
benefits. 150 An absolute rule is appropriate under these conditions 
because it is both efficient and clear. 
Two considerations argue strongly against application of an ab-
solute rule to antitrust contribution. First, scarcely a dozen antitrust 
defendants have claimed contribution in reported cases to date. This 
limited experience offers an inadequate basis for deciding that a bal-
ancing of policies would dictate identical results in most cases. 
Second, there is good reason to believe that a proper balance of 
antitrust policy goals will vary among cases, because the relevance of 
concerns for fairness, deterrence, settlement, and reduced complexity 
will vary significantly among cases. The degree of allocative, coer-
cive, and collusive unfairness will differ with the facts of each case. 
In one case an Olson Farms might pay twenty-four times the loss it 
directly caused; in another a large manufacturer which originated a 
price-fixing scheme might be seeking contribution from a tiny dis-
tributor. The importance of deterrence will vary with the type of 
violation151 and with the intent of the violator. 152 The fear of deter-
ring settlement is only relevant where contribution is sought against 
a settling defendant. Problems of complexity will increase with the 
number of violators and potential contribution claims involved in 
150. One part of these costs is the resources spent by the parties and courts in litigating 
unsuccessful claims. See text following note 161 i,yra. Another cost is the added expense in 
proving that contribution is warranted in a particular case. See text at note 162 i,yra. 
151. See text at notes 103-16 supra. 
152. See text at note 157 i,yra. 
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the suit. Changing these variables simultaneously could yield an in-
finite number of permutations, any one of which may tum up in a 
single case. Two hypothetical cases illustrate the potential extremes: 
(1) Large Manufacturing Company decides to fix prices in violation 
of the antitrust laws. It enlists the aid of Small Manufacturing Com-
pany. Buyer, who is injured by the conspiracy, brings a treble damages 
action against Small alone, but does not object to Small's contribution 
claim against Large. 
(2) Huge Manufacturing Company, with the acquiescence of sev-
eral hundred of its independent distributors, sets resale prices in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws, injuring Consumer. Consumer brings a 
treble damages action against Huge, because of Huge's size and sol-
vency, and against Tiny Distributing Company, one of the many dis-
tributors that sell Huge's products to Consumer. Consumer settles with 
Tiny before trial. Huge then files claims for contribution against each 
of the distributors that sell to Consumer, including Tiny, and Con-
sumer strenuously objects. 
In the first case, the balance of policy goals favors allowing con-
tribution. Denying contribution would cause considerable unfair-
ness here, because the most culpable violator escapes liability while a 
less culpable violator shoulders the entire burden of liability. Since 
the buyer sued only one defendant, there is no fear that a contribu-
tion action will deter settlement. Because there are only two violators 
and the plaintiff does not object to the contribution claim, the con-
cern for complexity of litigation is minimal. Where the resulting 
fairness so heavily outweighs any possible harmful effects, contribu-
tion should be allowed. 
In contrast, there are strong reasons for denying contribution in 
the second case. Any unfairness in denying contribution is mini-
mized by the defendant's status as ringleader of the conspiracy and 
sole intentional violator. Moreover, unlike the first case, other policy 
goals would be substantially affected if contribution were allowed. 
Deterrence would be reduced, since an intentional violator would be 
able to allocate the loss among all tortfeasors. Settlement would be 
discouraged if a later action for contribution against settling defend-
ants were allowed. Finally, complexity of litigation would be signifi-
cantly increased by the addition of numerous claims ( as the 
plaintiffs objection to the claims may suggest). 
If the relevance of policy goals can vary so drastically among 
cases, so may an appropriate balance of those goals, as the hypothet-
ical cases indicate. Because of that potential variance and our lim-
ited experience with antitrust contribution claims, an absolute rule 
seems premature. 
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B. Bright-Line Contribution Rules 
If an absolute rule is untenable, the next simplest standard makes 
the contribution issue tum on a single relevant fact. 153 Granting 
contribution to unintentional but not to intentional violators, or to 
price-fixers but not to non-price-fixers, are examples of "bright-line" 
rules. 154 The fact which is chosen to mark the line of such a rule 
should be drawn in such a way that improper results are minimized; 
the line should accurately separate cases in which contribution 
should be allowed from those where it should be forbidden. Since 
simplicity is the most positive attribute of a bright-line rule, it should 
also divide cases without adding significantly to the costs of antitrust 
litigation. The analysis below shows that bright-line rules based on 
intent and price-fixing inappropriately separate cases where contri-
bution is allowed from those where it is denied, and that a rule based 
on intent, far from simplifying antitrust litigation, would be exceed-
ingly expensive to apply. 
A bright-line rule based on the intent of the violator is intuitively 
attractive, for it turns on the culpability of the violator and dupli-
cates the English common-law rule allowing contribution only to un-
intentional tortfeasors. 155 Moreover, the rule takes into account two 
of the policy goals that must be balanced in deciding whether to al-
low contribution. Fairness is a weightier concern where the party 
seeking contribution unintentionally violated the law. 156 And a rule 
barring contribution can have little beneficial deterrent effect if the 
violator is unaware that his conduct is illegal and fails to consider 
the sanctions that could accompany it. 157 The shift of fairness and 
153. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 14 
HARV. L. REV. 226, 278-79 (1960). 
154. The rules proposed in lhe Bayh Bill and the Olson Farms decision are not precisely 
"bright-line." The Bayh Bill mandates contribution in price-fixing cases, but leaves the issue 
open in non-price-fixing cases. See text at note 55 supra. Olson Farms bars contribution to 
intentional violators, but leaves a possible exception for unintentional violators. See text at 
note 51 supra. Nevertheless, even lhese distinctions produce starkly different standards for 
different classes of cases. That difference should be justified by !he policy considerations ad-
dressed here. 
155. See W. PROSSER, supra note l, § 50, at 305-06. 
156. To the extent that rules barring contribution are based on a desire to punish, see 
Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Torifeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 559-60 (1936); 
Leflar, supra note 3, at 134, it is inequitable to apply lhe punishment wilh equal harshness to 
intentional and unintentional violators. This inequity is magnified where the unintentional 
tortfeasor is barred from seeking contribution from one who intentionally violated the law, 
and hence is arguably more culpable. See W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 
358 F. Supp. 1388, 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1973), in which a court refused an intentional tortfeasor 
contribution from an unintentional violator, in part on fairness grounds. 
157. See Bohlen, supra note 156, at 558 (for unintentional torts "the deterrent force of the 
denial of contribution, save in rare instances, is itself entirely lheoretical"). The Abraham Con-
struction majority argues !hat barring contribution may give businesses further incentive to 
"steer wide" of conduct which might violate !he antitrust laws. This assumes that legal con• 
duct which approaches !he borders of illegality should be deterred. As the Supreme Court 
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deterrence with intent indicates a more likely tip of the balance to-
ward contribution in the case of an unintentional violator. 
Nevertheless, there still may be cases where the balance tips to-
ward contribution for an intentional violator. 158 The first hypotheti-
cal case above, in which a denial of contribution would allow a 
larger, more culpable manufacturer to escape liability while forcing 
a small distributor to pay the entire judgment, might b,e such a 
case. 159 At the same time, one can imagine cases where uninten-
tional violators should be denied contribution. Consider, for exam-
ple, the complexity that would result if large manufacturers filed 
contribution claims against all their distributors every time their sys-
tems of vertical restraints were challenged in private suits. Exactly 
how often claims would be wrongly decided under an intent-based 
rule is difficult to know because few defendants have claimed contri-
bution in reported cases to date. Until we have more experience 
with contribution in an antitrust context, we cannot be sure a line 
based on intent would not mistakenly balance policy goals in many 
cases. 
An intent-based rule would also add substantial costs to antitrust 
litigation. Distinguishing between intentional and unintentional vio-
lators is a difficult process. Ever since the Supreme Court ruled in 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 160 that the element of in-
tent is prerequisite to a criminal antitrust conviction, courts in crimi-
nal cases have struggled with different standards of proof of the 
required intent. 161 Defendants who are uncertain whether their vio-
recognized in United States v. United -States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), such an as-
sumption is mistaken: 
The imposition of criminal liability ... without inquiring into the intent with which [the 
violation] was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary 
and procompetitive conduct lying close to the border of impermissible conduct might be 
shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty 
regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a good faith error of judg-
ment. 
438 U.S. at 441. 
158. Some courts and commentators have suggested that intentional violators should be 
entitled to contribution. See, e.g., Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 
67, llO A.2d 24 (1954) (per Brennan, J., now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court) (allowing intentional tortfeasor contribution on statutory interpretation grounds), trial 
judgment modified on remand, 25 N.J. 17, 134 A.2d 761 (1957); Leflar, supra note 3, at 145-46; 
Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among Torifeasors, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 
203, 232 (1975). The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act gave a contribution 
right to intentional tortfeasors, as does the 1976 Uniform Comparable Fault Act. The 1955 
revision of the 1939 Act expressly denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors in section l(c). 
Several cases have indicated that intentional violators of the securities laws have contribution 
rights. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 230, 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin 
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
159. Another example is Professional Beauty, where a small distributor was singled out in a 
suit alleging a joint intentional violation with a manufacturer. See text at notes 14-18 supra. 
160. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
161. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 464-66 (3d Cir. 
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lations will be found to be intentional will inevitably bring a large 
number of unsuccessful claims, wasting their own resources as well 
as those of other parties and the courts. More importantly, drawing 
a line at intentional violations adds the difficult factual issue of in-
tent to private antitrust litigation, 162 thereby requiring the production 
of additional evidence. The uncertainty of the standard will induce 
parties to introduce as much evidence as possible on the issue. Be-
cause it may mistakenly balance policy goals in many cases, an in-
tent-based rule is not worth these added costs. 
A price-fixing line would even less satisfactorily separate cases 
where contribution is permitted from those where it is forbidden. A 
rule granting contribution only to price-fixers would provide relief in 
both of the hypothetical cases described above163 even though contri-
bution in the second case would be inappropriate. The rule does not 
seem to reflect any of the policy goals discussed in Part II. Indeed, 
one could argue that, since horizontal price-fixing is among the most 
clearly anticompetitive practices forbidden by the antitrust laws, 164 
the deterrent effect of barring contribution 165 is of the greatest im-
portance when applied to this type of violation. 166 A rule granting 
contribution rights to price-fixers alone is therefore likely to balance 
policy goals incorrectly in many cases. 
One could base a bright-line rule on many other criteria. Contri-
bution could be allowed only against non-settling defendants, or 
only where the potential contribution claims number less than ten, or 
only where the case involves a practice that is already sufficiently 
deterred. Each of these rules turns on one of the antitrust policy 
goals relevant to the contribution controversy. But where multiple 
goals must be balanced, any single bright line drawn without the 
benefit of substantial experience will probably fail to reflect some of 
the goals, and a mistaken balance may result in many cases. A 
bright-line antitrust contribution rule, like an absolute rule, therefore 
seems inappropriate. 
1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d i 101, 1104-06 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 79 (1980). 
162. Under present law an unintentional violator of the antitrust laws may be found liable 
in a civil suit. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,436 n.13 (1978). 
A private plaintiff therefore need not prove the defendant intended to violate the law to suc-
ceed in his suit. 
163. See text following note 152 supra. 
164. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
165. See text at notes 106-09 supra. 
166. It is not obvious what antitrust policies would be furthered by drawing the line at 
"price-fixing," which is essentially a conclusory term attached to any of a variety of practices 
that are held to be per se illegal, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 
441 U.S. l, 8-9 (1979). The authors of the Bayh Bill may have thought that unfairness was 
especially prevalent in price-fixing cases. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 14. 
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C. A Case-by-Case Contribution Rule 
Under a case-by-case rule, judges base a decision to grant or 
deny contribution claims on the balance of policy goals presented in 
each particular case. Multiple factors, including fairness, deterrence, 
settlement, and complexity of the litigation could be considered in 
each case. Added costs and uncertainty result when policies must be 
balanced on a case-by-case basis, but the uncertainty, at least, can be 
reduced by drafting flexible guidelines for the exercise of judicial 
discretion. As a common law of contribution evolves from applica-
tion of the guidelines, attorneys will learn when to expect contribu-
tion rights. Several commentators favor a case-by-case antitrust 
contribution rule. 167 Two considerations indicate the appropriate-
ness of a case-by-case rule in the antitrust context. 
First, because there has been so little experience with contribu-
tion in antitrust cases, any rigid rule enacted now will likely yield 
mistaken results later. 168 Past experience with the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Acts shows that rigid contribution rules 
strain severely under the weight of diverse cases that demand vary-
ing results. 169 A case-by-case rule avoids this pitfall because a differ-
ent balance can be struck in each case. Experience may eventually 
show that fears about contribution's effect on deterrence, settlements, 
or complexity of litigation were unwarranted. If so, judges can be-
come more liberal in granting contribution. Or experience may 
show that contribution excessively diminishes deterrence, discour-
ages settlements, or complicates· litigation. Should these threats be 
realized, judges could withhold contribution rights except in cases of 
extreme unfairness. In any event, a case-by-case rule would give 
judges the flexibility they need to modify their decisions as they gain 
experience with antitrust contribution claims. 
A second reason to adopt a case-by-case rule is that several diffi-
cult issues within the contribution controversy - such as how to 
measure contribution shares and how to handle settlements and 
claim reduction - can best be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
Contribution shares could be allocated among violators on a per 
capita basis, or according to comparative fault, or according to each 
violator's share of the sales, purchases, or profits associated with the 
violation. 170 _A method of allocation appropriate in one case could 
167. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 28-29, 41-42 (Supplemental Views of Senators 
Metzenbaum and Kennedy); Minority Report, supra note 61, at § l; Address by Professor 
Jonathan Rose, ABA Antitrust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979), quoted in SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 53, at 28. 
168. Cf. Bok, supra note 153, at 300 (noting that the consequence of formulating merger 
rules on the basis of limited knowledge is that "we are very likely to make mistakes"). 
169. See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1966). 
170. A pro rata or per capita measure of contribution shares, which was mandated in Pro-
fessional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, l 182 & n.4 (8th 
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produce extremely unfair results in another, 171 and courts should 
therefore have the :flexibility to use different methods in different 
cases.172 Settlement and claim reduction pose an even more difficult 
dilemma. Defendants may be coerced into settlement even where 
they have meritorious defenses unless either (1) contribution against 
settling defendants is permitted (thereby preventing coercion but si-
multaneously reducing defendants' incentives to settle) or (2) plain-
tiffs' claim against remaining defendants is reduced in the event of 
settlement (thereby reducing plaintiffs' incentives to settle). Since we 
are unsure how frequently a defendant is forced to abandon a meri-
torious defense, perhaps the best solution is to let judges fashion ap-
propriate relief when this situation arises. 173 
Until these sub-issues are resolved in a particular case, a judge 
may not be able to decide whether contribution should be allowed at 
all. Contribution may be appropriate if one measure of contribution 
is adopted but inappropriate if a different measure is employed. 
And unless a court can find some means of preserving the parties' 
incentives to settle, denial of contribution may be appropriate. Be-
cause the sub-issues are best decided by looking at the facts of each 
case, little additional costs are incurred by looking to the same facts 
in deciding the broader issue of when to allow contribution. 
Having decided that courts should have discretion to grant or 
deny contribution on a case-by-case basis, 174 we should provide 
guidelines for the exercise of that discretion. Otherwise, "in seeking 
to be :flexible, we may simply be obscure."175 The following guide-
lines seem especially appropriate, for they are based on the antitrust 
Cir. 1979), would make each violator contribute equally to any final judgment. A comparative 
fault measure determines contribution according to the parties' relative culpability. The trend 
among the states is to allocate contribution shares on a comparative fault basis in tort cases. 
See note 3 supra. 
The provision in the ABA Statute is ambiguous, measuring contribution shares according 
to the parties' "relative responsibility" for the damages. ABA STATUTE, supra note 60, at§ (g). 
Under that statute, percentage of sales or purchases might be used when appropriate in some 
cases while relative culpability would be used when that measure is appropriate. See ADA 
Report, supra note 13, at E-4. 
171. A per capita measure of contribution shares is extremely inequitable where there are 
only a few violators of widely varying culpability. A comparative fault rule may entail intoler-
able complexity in antitrust suits involving large numbers of defendants. An allocation based 
on percentage of sales or purchases applies easily to a horizontal antitrust violation, but is 
troublesome when applied to a vertical restraint. 
172. See Sellers, supra note 2, at 852 (1979). 
173. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 41-42. The relief might take the form of a 
contribution claim against a settling defendant, or reduction of the plaintiffs claim, or some 
combination of the two. 
174. A note analyzing contribution under the securities laws similarly concluded that a 
case-by-case rule was appropriate there: "The number and magnitude of unresolved questions 
in this field argues strongly against the premature appearance of hard and fast rules, and 
equally strongly in favor of continuing judicial flexibility in contribution claims." Note, supra 
note 16, at 1314. 
175. Bok, supra note 153, at 349. 
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policy goals most directly affected by antitrust contribution.176 
A judge should consider the following questions when faced with 
a claim for contribution: 
(1) Fairness and Settlement 
A. Allocation of Loss: How great a difference is there between 
the damages the defendant would pay if contribution were allowed and 
if it were barred? 
• B. Improper Motives: Does the plaintiff have an improper motive 
in singling out the party seeking contribution for his treble damages 
suit? 
C. Coercion of Settlements: If contribution is denied, will this de-
fendant realistically be forced to settle despite a reasonable probability 
of a successful defense on the merits? If so, which of the following 
remedies, if any, would be most likely to preserve incentives to settle? 
- 1. reducing the plaintiffs claim by the amount of the settling 
defendants' contribution shares. 
- 2. allowing contribution claims to proceed against settling 
defendants. 
(2) Deterrence . 
A. Is increased deterrence likely to result if contribution is denied 
this type of violator? 
B. If so, is increased deterrence of the illegal practice at issue de-
sirable? 
(3) Complexity of Litigation 
A. To what degree will allowing contribution in this case burden 
the court and the plaintiff with added litigation costs? 
B. Does the plaintiff reasonably object to allowance of the contri-
bution claim? If plaintiff objects, will severance of contribution claims 
and issues under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) be feasible? 
This list of questions is by no means exhaustive; courts should be 
allowed to consider all the circumstances of each unique case. The 
important feature of this list, or of any set of guidelines, is that it 
focuses the courts' attention on the sometimes-conflicting goals of 
antitrust policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Antitrust contribution rules may have significant effects on the 
degree to which antitrust policy goals of fairness, deterrence, pre-
trial settlement, and simplicity of litigation are achieved. The impact 
of contribution on each of these goals varies widely among the di-
verse cases in which contribution may be sought. Because of this 
variance and our limited experience with antitrust contribution 
claims, rigid rules such as those proposed by the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits, the Bayh Bill, and the ABA Statute are inappropriate. Un-
176. Although the guidelines listed in Professional Beauty are helpful, see note 22 supra, 
the list here is tailored more precisely to the policy goals affected by antitrust contribution. 
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til such time as experience reveals an absolute or bright-line rule that 
would efficiently balance policy goals, district courts should have the 
discretion to decide in each case whether granting or denying contri-
bution will better promote antitrust policy. 
The issues raised by antitrust contribution "rank with the most 
complicated under the antitrust laws."177 Courts have found that 
complicated antitrust issues resolved in a rapid and simplistic man-
ner often return to haunt them. 178 They can avoid repeating this 
mistake in the area of antitrust contribution by adopting the case-by-
case rule ~f Professional Beauty. 
177. SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 28. 
178. For example, a premature formulation led to trouble in the area of non-price vertical 
restraints. A rigid rule that certain restraints were per se illegal, see United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), had to be retracted after experience showed the need 
for greater flexibility. See Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
